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WORKER, INDUSTRY, AND GOVERNMENT 
ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE CANADA-U.S. 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
By Kevin C. Kennedyt 
These few pages are designed to give the reader an overview 
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FT A or Agreement) 
and a broad analysis of its ramifications for industry and 
labor, in particular the significance of the Agreement for the 
a~tomotive sector. This paper will also familiarize the reader 
with the most controversial portion of the Agreement, Chapter 
19 dealing with the resolution of dumping and subsidy com-
plaints. Implementation of the Agreement should not be viewed 
as a panacea for resolving all of the trade problems Canada 
and the United States have recently encountered. On the con-
trary, the Agreement is certain to create new ones and perhaps 
exacerbate old ones, especially in view of the negotiators' failure 
to bring about any major change in the most contentious area 
of all, the substantive law governing the resolution of dumping 
and subsidy cases. Before beginning, let me add two disclaimers: 
I am neither an economist nor a political scientist. Conse-
quently, any economic or political analysis I make in this paper 
should be taken with a grain of salt. 
A FEW BASIC STATISTICS 
I am sure you have heard many of the basic statistics before, I 
but let me repeat them for you and perhaps give you a few 
new ones. Although Canada and the United States are roughly 
t Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. J.D. 1977, Wayne State Uni-
versity School of Law; L.L.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. Portions of this paper 
are based on earlier articles by the author entitled, Binational Dispute Settlement 
Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 71 
(1988); and The Canadian and U.S. Responses to Subsidization of International 
Trade: Toward a Harmonized Countervailing Duty Legal Regime, 20 L. & POL'y 
INT'L Bus. 683 (1989). 
1. The source for these statistics is 1988 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 223 (1988). 
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the same size geographically, demographically the United States 
is ten times more populous than Canada, the United States 
having not quite 250 million people, Canada a little more than 
twenty-five million. Ninety percent of Canada's population lives 
within 100 miles of the U.S. border. United States per capita 
GNP in 1986 was $17,480; in Canada it was $14,120. The rate 
of inflation in Canada for the six-year period 1980-1986 was 
5.5 percent; in the United States it was 4.2 percent. If you 
were Canadian-born in 1986 you can expect to live to be 
seventy-six, one year longer than your neighbor to the south. 
Both cou'ntries' economies are mainly service driven. The dis-
tribution of gross domestic product among agriculture, industry, 
and services in the United States is two percent for agriculture, 
thirty-one percent for industry, and sixty-seven percent for 
services. In Canada those figures are three percent, thirty-six 
percent, and sixty-one percent, respectively.2 The distribution 
of the labor force among agriculture, industry, and services is 
roughly the same as the distribution of gross domestic product, 
with two-thirds of the labor force in each country being em-
ployed in the service sector of the economy. 3 Unemployment 
in Canada, in 1988, averaged 7.8 percent, a fourteen-year low, 
with Ontario (Canada's most populous and industrialized prov-
ince) registering an unemployment rate of five percent in 1988.4 
In the United States the unemployment rate for 1988 averaged 
5.4 percent. S • 
.AN OVERVIEW OF THE FREE TRADE AOREEMENr 
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement has been tagged 
with many labels-historic, unprecedented, ground breaking, 
2. Id. at 227. 
3. Radebaugh, International Trade in Service: An Overview, in THE CANADA! 
U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, THE IMPACT ON SERVICE INDUSTRIES 19 (E. Fry & 
L. Radebaugh, eds. 1988). 
4. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 40th Report, at 90 (USITC 
Pub. 2208 1989) [hereinafter Operation of the Trade Agreements Program]. 
5. The Economist, Sept. 2, 1989, at 99. 
6. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) 
[hereinafter FTA or Agreement]. For a discussion of the FTA, see The U.S.! 
Canada Free Trade Agreement (PLI 1989); United States/Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment: The Economic and Legal Implications (1988). A.B.A. SEC. INT. L. & PRAC. 
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trail blazing. Regardless of one's sympathies, it is difficult not 
to think of the Free Trade Agreement in these terms, given 
the enormous flow of cross-border trade between Canada and 
the United States. It probably comes as no surprise that a 
negotiation with such an ambitious agenda, and with such a 
broad scope of coverage, would produce a document as prolix 
as the FT A, 7 being divided into eight parts and subdivided 
into twenty-one chapters. The twenty-one chapters are further 
divided into 150 articles establishing the basic obligations of 
the parties, with several annexes fleshing-out some of the more 
bare-boned articles within the Agreement. 
The most significant substantive provisions of the FT A are 
those covering trade in goods and services, government pro-
curement, and investment. The most significant FT A procedural 
provision, and certainly the most controversial in the entire 
Agreement, creates a binational dispute panel for resolving 
dumping and subsidy complaints. Part One of the FT A outlines 
the objectives and scope of the Agreement. Part Two regulates 
trade in goods and provides for the elimination of all tariffs 
on bilateral trade in goods by January 1, 1998, using three 
formulae. For some sectors (e.g., computers, motorcycles, whis-
key), the Agreement immediately eliminated tariffs upon its 
entry into force on January 1, 1989. For a second group of 
sectors (e.g., paper, paints, furniture), tariffs are phased out 
in five equal annual stages, beginning January 1, 1989. The 
elimination of all oth~r tariffs will occur by January 1, 1998, 
in ten equal annual steps for a third group of trade-sensitive 
products such as textiles, wearing apparel, tires, steel, and 
appliances.8 Part Three, dealing with government procurement, 
lowers the threshold in the GATT Government Procurement 
Code from US$171,OOO to US$25,OOO, i.e., federal government 
purchases above this threshold will be open to competitive 
bidding by each party. Part Four covers trade in services, 
investment, and business travel. With regard to services, Canada 
and the United States will extend national treatment to trade 
7. The public copy of the Agreement published by the Canadian Department 
of External Affairs is over 300 pages, 250 of which are text, the balance being 
explanatory notes. 
8. FTA, art. 401. 
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in most services so that agriculture, mining, construction, in-
surance, real estate, and commercial service providers will be 
treated in the same manner as domestic firms providing those 
same services.9 In the field of investment, this same national 
treatment obligation is assumed in connection with the estab-
lishment of new businesses,lo with a liberalization of rules for 
the acquisition of existing businesses in Canada. II Part Five, 
financial services, accords national treatment to investors in 
the financial services market. Part Six covers settlement of 
disputes arising under the Agreement. Part Seven assembles a 
number of miscellaneous provisions. Finally, Part Eight deals 
with entry into· force and duration of the FT A. 
MERCHANDISE TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED 
STATEs-THE POTENTIAL WINNERS ON EACH SIDE OF THE 
BORDER 
As noted, the FT A liberalizes all trade in goods and most 
trade in services between two countries with the largest volume 
of two-way trade in goods in the world. The United States 
buys more goods from and sells more goods to Canada than 
any other country. In the two-year period 1984-85, Canada 
bought twenty-two percent of all U.S. exports, twice that of 
second-place Japan. 12 Two-way merchandise trade between Can-
ada and the United States totalled $147 billion in 1988.13 In 
1988 U.S. exports to Canada increased 15.'6 percent over 1987, 
more than doubling the 7.2 percent increase of 1987. 14 U.S. 
imports from Canada likewise increased during 1988 by 13.9 
percent over the previous year .IS Even though U.S. export 
performance improved in 1988, the United States still had a 
9. FfA, art. 1401, 1402, annex 1408. Excluded from the scope of coverage 
are transportation services, most telecommunications services, and the services of 
doctors, dentists, lawyers, and teachers. [d. 
10. FfA, art. 1602. 
11. FfA, art. 1607. The review threshold by Investment Canada for acquisition 
of existing businesses is to be raised from CAN$5 million to CAN$150 million by 
1992. [d. 
12. P. WONNACOTT, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: THE QUEST FOR FREE 
TRADE 2 (1987) [hereinafter WONNACOTT]. 
13. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 179-80. 
14. [d. at 91. 
15. [d. 
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merchandise trade deficit with Canada in 1988 (as it has every 
year but once since 1970) of $14.8 billion, a one billion dollar 
increase over 1987. 16 Trade in automobiles and replacement 
parts dominates U.S.-Canada merchandise trade, comprising 
over one-third of all merchandise trade between the two coun-
tries. Imports from Canada of passenger cars increased over 
thirty percent in 1988. 17 In addition to automobiles, trucks, 
and motor vehicle parts, the other leading V.S. exports to 
Canada in 1988 were computers, parts of office machinery, 
and coal. IS The leading V.S. imports from Canada in 1988 
were passenger cars, parts of motor vehicles, newsprint, trucks, 
crude oil, natural gas, wood pulp, and lumber .19 
Who are the predicted winners under the FT A? Various 
private and governmental studies have been conducted to answer 
this question. A sampling of the predicted winners on the 
American side of the border are manufacturers and producers 
of chemicals, home appliances, electrical equipment, food and 
beverages, footwear, furniture, machinery, and agricultural 
equipment. 20 V.S. sales of furniture are expected to increase 
significantly after 1993, according to Commerce Department 
data, when tariffs on furniture are eliminated. 21 The Michigan 
institutional furniture industry should thus benefit. Also, in 
light of rising Canadian demand for textiles and apparel, the 
V.S. textile and clothing industries are expected to benefit from 
the FTA, the Commerce Department has recently projected. 22 
Interestingly, the Canadian Department of Industry, Science, 
and Technology also predicts that the Canadian textile and 
apparel industry will gain from the FT A. 23 
Canadian producers and manufacturers of forestry products, 
paper and paper products, petroleum products, and urban 
transportation equipment are some of the predicted winners 
on the Canadian side of the border. 24 As I will explain in 
16. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. at 92. 
19. [d. 
20. See WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 33-36. 
21. See 6 Int'} Trade Rep. (BNA) 373 (1989). 
22. [d. . 
23. See [d. at 109. 
24. [d. 
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greater detail below, "because Canada has been permitted to 
retain both its production-based duty remission program until 
1996 and its export-based duty remission program" to third 
countries until 1998, the Canadian auto assembly industry is 
expected to benefit from the FT A. The Canadian government 
projects that Canadian firms in the electrical wire and cable, 
power transmission equipment, shipbuilding and ship repair, 
bus manufacturing, food processing equipment, pulp and paper 
equipment, and sporting goods sectors will have to rationalize 
by consolidating their operations to varying degrees in the new 
FT A environment. 25 Most typically, consolidation will take the 
form of reducing the number of product lines a firm produces, 
thereby concentrating on the most profitable products. Intra-
industry rationalization does not necessarily mean a reduction 
of jobs. Nevertheless, some firms may not survive, which will 
mean worker dislocation at a minimum. 
Economic forecasts vary considerably as to the effects of 
the FT A on the North American steel industry. In recent years 
Canadian steel companies generally have been healthier than 
their competitors to the south. Some economists attribute this 
success to lower wages in the Canadian industry, although since 
1982 the hourly wage for U.S. steel workers has declined while 
the wages for Canadian steel workers has gradually risen. Still, 
the cost differential for a ton of steel is approximately $40-
$50 to the advantage of Canada.26 In the opinion of at least 
one economist, "because of slack demand and competition 
from overseas and minimills, the old steel-producing areas are 
likely to face contin~ing economic and political problems-
regardless of what happens to bilateral trade between the United 
States and Canada. "27 
The identification of U.S. industries benefitting most from 
the FT A does not mean the demise of a competitor in Canada. 
The FTA is not a zero-sum game. It does mean, however, 
that the Canadian competitor will have to adjust by either 
specializing or contracting its operations. 
25. See id. at 49. 
26. Crandall, A Sectoral Perspective: Steel, PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 236 (R. Stem, P. Tresize & J. Whalley, eds. 1987). 
27. WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 40. 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FT A FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR28 
811 
Two-way trade in automotive products constitutes the largest 
segment of merchandise trade between the United States and 
Canada, with Canada enjoying a trade surplus of over $6 
billion in automotive trade in 1988. Nearly all trade in au-
tomotive products between the United States and Canada has 
been, and continues to be, duty-free as a consequence of the 
1965 Automotive Products Trade Agreement, the so-called Auto 
Pact,29 a sectoral free trade agreement between Canada and 
the United States and the precursor of the FT A. The FT A 
will operate in tandem with the Auto Pact until 1998, at which 
time all duties on automotive products will be eliminated. The 
FT A has altered the rules of origin for automotive products, 
now requiring a fifty percent North American value-added 
content based upon direct cost of processing and value of 
materials30 before automotive products can be considered the 
product of Canada or the United States and thereby qualify 
for duty-free treatment. 31 The fifty percent direct cost content 
rule effectively increases the North American content require-
ments of the Auto Pact which includes indirect costs in its 
value-added calculation, costs which are excluded under the 
FTA (e.g., administrative, marketing, legal, advertising, pack-
ing, and communication costS).32 
28. For a discussion of the automotive provisions of the PTA, see Battram 
& Murray, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and North American 
Automotive Production, THE U.S.lCANADA FREE TRADE'AGREEMENT 37 (1989) ABA 
SEC. INT. L. & PRAC. 339 [hereinafter Battram & Murray]; Stock & Evelev, The 
United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement and the Automotive Industry in North 
America, in UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (1988) A.B.A. SEC. INT. L. & PRAC. 
29. Agreement Concerning Automotive Products Between the Government of 
the United States and the Government of Canada, January 16, 1965. The United 
States implementing legislation for the Auto Pact is Pub. L. No. 89-283, 79 Stat. 
1016 (1965) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2001-33 (1982». See generally Operation of 
the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 95, 97. 
30. PTA, art. 301. 
31. Chapter 3, setting out rules of origin, and Chapter 10, governing trade 
in automotive products, are the chief PTA provisions relating to trade in autos 
and auto parts. 
32. PTA, art. 301.2. 
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The UA Wand the auto parts manufacturers were, and 
continue to be, disturbed with this fifty percent rule, believing 
that a sixty percent content requirement should have been 
adopted in order to keep third-country auto parts producers-
especially those that manufacture drive trains and engines-
from claiming duty-free treatment. 33 For example, because the 
engine and transmission represent about thirty percent of the 
manufacturing cost of a car, a Canadian auto manufacturer 
could export a car, assembled in Canada with a third-country 
drive train, to the United States duty free. The Big Three 
would have preferred a sixty percent content rule, but found 
the fifty percent level acceptable in view of Canada's firm 
rejection of a higher level and of the initial proposal for a 
thirty-five percent content level (the same level used in the 
U.S.-Israel free trade agreement and the Caribbean Basin In-
itiative).34 Governor Blanchard urged that at least a sixty percent 
content rule be adopted because of the FTA's rules on trans-
formation of goods.3s Under those rules,36 if an item imported 
from a third country undergoes sufficient transformation in 
Canada so that a change in tariff classification takes place, 
that item is considered the product of Canada. Consequently, 
raw materials from third countries could be imported into 
Canada, manufactured into auto parts, and shipped to the 
United States duty free, even if the Canadian value added was 
less than fifty percent of the value of the item, provided that 
a change in tariff classification takes place. Similarly, if those 
parts were included in a Canadian assembled car, they would 
count in meeting the fifty percent content rule. Representative 
John bingell also led calls for a change in the content rule 
to sixty percent. In the end, however, the only thing that was 
33. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 96. 
34. Statement of Thomas H. Hanna, President and Chief Executive Officer 
for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., pre-
sented to the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
March 1, 1988, reprinted in 2 U.S.-Canada FfA, A Legal Guide (BNA) 0-67, 0-
74 (1988). 
35. See Statement of Marc Santucci, Advisor to the Governor on Trade Policy, 
State of Michigan, on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Before the Committee 
on Finance, United States Senate, April 15, 1988, reprinted in 2 U.S.-Canada FTA, 
A Legal Guide (BNA) 0-83, 0-86 (1988). 
36. FTA; art. 301.2. 
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secured was a promise from Canada to discuss the fifty percent 
content rule at a later date. 37 In that connection a thirty member 
blue-ribbon panel of U.S. and Canadian auto industry rep-
resentatives has been established under the FT A38 to address 
these and other issues.39 In May, U.S. Trade Representative 
Hills and Commerce Secretary Mosbacher requested the panel 
to make recommendations on whether the local content rule 
should be bumped from fifty percent to sixty percent and to 
report its recommendations by June of 1991.40 The panel met 
for the first time in Toronto on August 8, 1989, and it was 
agreed that the main focus of the panel would be on the 
industry's long-term competitiveness.41 Content rules were not 
mentioned as an agenda item. 
A second automotive sector negotiating item that was not 
resolved to the complete satisfaction of the United States is 
the controversial Canadian duty remission program, portions 
of which will not be eliminated until 1998. The export-based 
phase of the Canadian duty remission program, which gave 
foreign auto manufacturers based in Canada a duty rebate on 
their Canadian imports when they exported autos with Can-
andian-manufactured parts, was eliminated completely upon 
entry into force of the FTA with regard to exports of autos 
and auto parts to the United States.42 This phase of the duty. 
rebate scheme will not be phased out completely, however, 
until 1998,43 so that duty remission is still available when 
Canadian manufactured parts are included in cars built in 
Canada and exported to third countries. 
The export-based duty remission scheme has the potential 
for injuring American auto and auto parts manufacturers in 
two ways: first, foreign auto manufacturers based in Canada 
will continue to have an incentive to purchase Canadian over 
American equipment parts; second, to the extent the Canadian 
duty remission program serves as an incentive to export cars 
37. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 179-80. 
38. ITA, art. 1003. 
39. 6 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 450 (1989). 
40. [d. at 651. . 
41. [d. at 1076. 
42. ITA, art. lOO2(a). 
43. FTA, art. lOO2.2(b). 
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to third countries, it could shrink American auto and auto 
parts sales to third countries. 
Under the production-based. facet of the Canadian duty re-
mission program, foreign auto manufacturers with production 
facilities in Canada are given a duty rebate on imports of their 
products into Canada when they include Canadian-manufac-
tured parts in their vehicles built in Canada, regardless of 
whether such vehicles are ultimately exported. This phase of 
the duty remission program, benefitting Honda, Hyundai, Toy-
ota, and the new GM-Suzuki joint venture, will not be elim-
inated until 1996.44 The program obviously gives Canadian-
based foreign auto manufacturers a strong incentive to buy 
Canadian auto parts rather than American-made ones. 
Governor Blanchard challenged the duty remission program 
as an illegal export subsidy in a petition filed with the office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in October of 1988.45 
Even though the USTR acknowledged that the Canadian duty 
remission programs distort trade and investment patterns in its 
summary of the PTA, the USTR rejected Governor Blanchard's 
petition for lack of standing, adding that in any event the 
problem would be remedied under the FTA.46 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR LABOR 
The costs of protectionism are high for consumers who pay 
higher prices for goods that are turned out by a protected 
industry. Firms that are protected lack the incentive to ra-
tionalize and modernize. For Canadian firms the PTA will 
mean greater market access to the United States and permit 
economies of scale, but the pressure to consolidate operations 
will be felt the greatest in Canada. Not that consolidation is 
necessarily a bad thing. On the contrary, witness the struggling 
Canadian auto industry in the years immediately prior to the 
Auto Pact when General Motors of Canada produced 20 pas-
senger car models on two production lines in a single plant 
in CanadaY With duty-free access to the American market 
44. FfA, art. 1002.3. 
45. See 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1369 (1988). 
46. See id. at 1535. 
47. See Battram & Murray, supra note 28, at 43 n.5. 
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following conclusion of the Auto Pact, the Canadian auto 
industry flourished. Still, because of the keen U.S. competition 
and because Canada is so trade dependent, rationalization is 
imperative. Pressure will be greatest in Ontario and Quebec, 
the manufacturing centers of Canada, although the phased-in 
elimination of tariffs will give firms some breathing room. The 
question remains, can firms adjust in time? Much of the overall 
adjustment that will occur on either side of the border will 
be the less painful intra-industry type of consolidation, where 
firms specialize for the larger North American market.48 But 
in the furniture industry, for example, where the United States 
is expected to reap tremendous gains in light of the fifteen-
percent Canadian tariff wall that will be eliminated over the 
next five years, 3,500 Canadians employed in the furniture 
sector are expected to lose their jobs.49 Comparable scenarios 
may be played out in other industries which have been protected 
by high tariffs over the years and, as a consequence, have 
failed to stay competitive internationally. Coupling this pressure 
to rationalize with Canadian workers' apparent affinity for 
strikes-during 1980-1982 Canada lost more time proportionally 
to strikes than any other western nation - the upshot may 
be Canadian employers threatening to relocate or actually re-
locating all or part of their operations in the United States. 
On the U.S. side of the border the UA W has been one of 
the more vocal opponents of the Agreement. The most vocal 
opposition to the FTA in Canada (outside of government) has 
come from the Ontario Federation of Labor (OFL) which has 
projected that seven percent of the Canadian workforce will 
experience serious adjustment costs. so Earlier this year the OFL 
presented a paper to Ontario Premier David Peterson outlining 
its misgivings about the FT A. 51 Its greatest concerns are the 
potential erosion of social programs and a leveling down of 
health, labor, and safety standards within Canadian industry 
in order to meet U.S. competition. The OFL is especially 
48. WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 33. 
49. 6 Int'. Trade Rep. (BNA) 76 (1989). 
50. See Adams, The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and Collective Bar-
gaining, 14 CANADA-UNITED 'STATES L.J. 41, 45 (1988) [hereinafter Adams]. 
51. See 6 Int'. Trade Rep. (BNA) 155 (1989). 
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concerned about any new subsidies code that may be eventually 
negotiated between the United States and Canada that would 
force Canada to restrict or cease using taxes to fund social 
service programs.52 The OFL also warned against overtures by 
management to make wage and benefit concessions because of 
the FTA.53 Job security will undoubtedly be the paramount 
negotiation item for Canadian labor, much as it was for the 
UAW in 1987 in the agreements it signed with Ford and General 
Motors. However, if the U.S. experience and response to 
foreign competition in the 1980's is any predictor, resisting 
wage concession contracts may be problematic for Canadian 
organized labor. By 1985 concession contracts constituted twenty-
five percent of all union contracts in the United States 54 (which 
is not to say that all such contracts have been detrimental to 
the employee since many have been coupled with job security 
guarantees) . 
The OFL's concerns about the fate of social service programs 
is probably unwarranted. The Commerce Department has never 
found any social service program to be a countervailable sub-
sidy. At the same time, however, I am not as sanguine about 
the effect the FT A may have on Canadian health, labor, and 
safety legislation. De facto harmonization of U.S. and Canadian 
workplace standards is not out of the realm of possibility. 
Although the FT A has been touted as an economic agreement, 
Canadian firms will feel pressure to reduce costs in order to 
meet U.S. competition. Overall, I am told, Canada has more 
comprehensive and protective workplace legislation than does 
the United States.55 If this is true, then Canada might experience 
business flight to the southern United States as has the northern 
United States. Northern U.S. firms have made an exodus to 
the south where wage rates are lower and hostility to organized 
labor is high. The UA W has, in fact, suggested that as goes 
the South so goes Canada. 
The labor movement on both sides of the border will probably 
lose membership as a percentage of the total workforce given 
52. [d. 
53. [d. at 156. 
54. Adams, supra note 50, at 51. 
55. See Adams, supra note 50, at 43. 
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the forecast that the greatest growth in new jobs will be in 
the service sector, historically difficult to organize. Hardest 
hit, however, will be organized labor in Canada where close 
to half of the non-agricultural workforce is organized, com-
pared to less than twenty percent in the United States. 56 
TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE TO WORKERS 
While Canada and the United States should experience a 
net gain in jobs and income, painful adjustments will occur 
in the manufacturing sector. Both the United States and Canada 
have trade adjustment assistance programs to cushion the blow 
and smooth the transition for workers displaced by imports. 
In the United States workers are eligible for trade adjustment 
assistance (TAA) if: (1) a significant number of workers in a 
firm have been separated; (2) the firm's sales and/or production 
have decreased absolutely; and (3) imports of competitive mer-
chandise contributed importantly to the workers' separation 
and to the decline in the firm's sales or producti,on.57 Once 
the Department of Labor certifies a worker group as eligible, 
an individual worker within that group must pass through a 
regulatory and procedural labyrinth to further qualify for re-
ceipt of TAA benefits.58 The benefits provided workers under 
the U.S. trade adjustment assistance program59 include trade 
readjustment allowances60 (essentially extended unemployment 
insurance) of up to fifty-two weeks (less weeks of unemploy-
56. See Adams, supra note 50, at 47-48. This disparity in level of organization 
is attributable in large part to the different certification procedures in the two 
countries. In the United States an election is required before a union may be 
certified - elections that are often hard fought and rife with unfair labor practices. 
In Canada certification is based on employees signing union cards. Id. 
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (1986). The term "contributed importantly" means a 
cause which is important but not necessarily more important than any other cause. 
Id. § 2272(b)(1). 
58. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2291-98 (1986). 
59. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271·2397, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100·418, 102 Stat. 1243 (1988). See generally 
E. ROSSIDES, U.S. IMPORT TRADE REGULATION 378-91 (l986)[hereinafter ROSSIDES]; 
Sorrentino, Trade Readjustment Assistance for Unemployed Workers, 14 U. ToL. 
L. REv. 285 (1983); Bratt, Issues in Worker Certification and Questions of Future 
Direction in the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, 14 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 
819 (1982). 
60. See 19 U.S.C. § 2291(a) (1986). 
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ment compensation payments61), supplemental wage allowances 
to ensure that any re-employed worker's wage is at least eighty 
percent of her previous wage,62 job search allowances of up 
to $800,63 relocation assistance of up to $800,64 and job re-
training.6S Job retraining is now a mandatory condition for 
receipt of T AA benefits, pursuant to amendments made by 
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.66 Eighty 
million dollars has been appropriated to fund the job retraining 
phase of the T AA program.67 Trade adjustment assistance is 
authorized until September 1993 under the sunset provision of 
the 1988 Trade Act. 68 
In connection with program funding, the most controversial 
provision among the 1988 amendments to the T AA program 
is a measure to fund trade adjustment assistance programs 
through a 0.15 percent uniform ad valorem fee on imports to 
the United States.69 The President must seek multilateral agree-
ment under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to 
permit imposition of the fee, as well as seek bilateral agreement 
to impose the fee from countries with which the United States 
has a free trade agreement, i.e., Israel and Canada.70 The 
President has two years to reach such an agreement, at which 
time the· fee will automatically be imposed in the absence of 
an agreement, unless the President certifies that such imposition 
would not be in the national economic interest. 71 Congress can 
override this certification, however, by enactment of. a joint 
disapproval resolution.72 
The U.S. trade adjustment assistance program was under 
constant attack and threat of elimina~ion under the Reagan 
61. [d. at § 2293(a)(1). 
62. [d. at § 2318(b)(2)(B)(i). 
63. [d. at § 2297(a)(I). 
64. [d. at § 2298(d)(2). 
65. [d. at § 2296. 
66. [d. at § 2291 (b). 
67. [d. at § 2296(a)(2)(A). 
68. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1251, § 1426(b)(1) (1988). 
69. [d. at § 1428(b)(I)(A). See 19 U.S.C. § 2397 (1988). 
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. 
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administration.73 Trade adjustment assistance in the United 
States has suffered from underfunding, which in turn places 
pressure on the Labor Department to deny petitions.74 TAA 
program activity in the early 1980's slowed, with the number 
of certified workers being ninety-five percent fewer in 1981 
than in 1979, due largely to the decrease in the number of 
certified workers in the automobile industry.7s Nevertheless, 
the largest number of certified workers from the inception of 
the program continues to be in the automotive, textile, and 
primary metals industries.76 Just last year the UA W won a 
six-year legal battle that challenged Labor Department guide-
lines as being unlawfully restrictive. 77 These guidelines resulted 
in the wrongful denial of T AA benefits to 30,000 Michigan 
workers who, the UA W estimates, are each entitled to a $22,500 
lump-suin payment.78 
Nearly as many workers have been certified as have been 
denied certification,79 and most recently the number of workers 
who have been denied certification have far outnumbered those 
workers who were certified. In fiscal 1988, for example, nearly 
60,000 workers were certified as eligible, but another 76,000 
workers had their petitions denied.80 In fiscal 1987, approxi-
mately 112,000 workers were certified, but over 147,000 workers 
had their petitions denied.81 The amount of benefits paid to 
certified workers in fiscal 1986 was $116.6 million,82 $198 
million in fiscal 1987,83 and $185.8 million in fiscal 1988.84 
73. Bush Administration Abandons Reagan's Plan to Kill Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Program, 6 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 232-33 (1989); see Operation of the 
Trade Agreements Program, 38th Report, at 5-2 (USITC Pub. 1995 1987). 
74. See Bush Administration Abandons Reagan's Plan to Kill Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Program, 6 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 232-33 (1989). 
75. ROSSIDES, supra note 59, at 387. 
76. Id. 
77. See 5 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 1472 (1988). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 139. 
81. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 39th Report, at 5-2 (USITC 
Pub. 2095 1988). 
82. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 38th Report, at 5-3 (USITC 
Pub. 1995 1987). 
83. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 39th Report, at 5-3 (USITC 
Pub. 2095 1988). 
84. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 139. 
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Although these figures represent a marked improvement over 
the experience workers had in the early 1980's, they do not 
compare favorably with 1979 figures when 140,000 of 185,000 
workers had their petitions certified and $285 million in benefits 
was paid out. 85 
Trade adjustment assistance should help soften the landing 
of many displaced workers. Additional help will come from 
the sixty-day notice of a plant closing or mass layoff required 
under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act86 
for those workers employed by firms with 100 or more em-
ployees. Neither of these programs will prove helpful in smooth-
ing an otherwise rocky transition for displaced workers, however, 
without sympathetic administration of the T AA program by 
the Labor Department. As a country we only stand to gain 
from a free trade environment with Canada. Nevertheless, the 
Bush administration will have to be sensitive to the negative 
impact of the FT A for workers employed in inefficicent in-
dustries or firms who will lose their jobs because of competition 
from the north. Adequate funding and enlightened adminis-
tration of the trade adjustment assistance program by the 
Department of Labor will be essential. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGAL REGIME AND THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
What are the ramifications of the U.S.-Canada FTA for 
international trade, in particular for the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT)? The importance of the FT A 
provisions covering trade in services and investment, while in 
themselves noteworthy, transcend the Agreement itself. These 
provisions may portend important progress in the current GATT 
round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) , the Uruguay 
Round, being held in Geneva under GAIT auspices. The 
subjects of trade in services and investment are part of the 
Uruguay MTN Round negotiating agenda, for the first time 
85. ROSSIDES, supra note 59, at 387. 
86. Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-
09). 
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taking a GAIT MTN round beyond the subject of trade in 
goods. Ideally, the Agreement will serve as a catalyst and 
model for the Uruguay Round negotiators, creating momentum 
for the successful conclusion of multilateral GATT agreements 
covering those same subjects. 87 With the U.S.-Canada FT A the 
prospects for their inclusion in future GATT Codes are sig-
nificantly improved, but are not necessarily guaranteed. Con-
verse1y, it was a near certainty that without a U.S.-Canada 
FT A covering these subjects, their successful negotiation in the 
Uruguay Round was doomed. 
While the FTA provisions on trade in services and investment 
are trail blazing and may genera~e the momentum needed to 
advance them on the Uruguay Round agenda, a U.S.-Canada 
FT A may simultaneously exacerbate world trade frictions by 
causing trade diversion from third countries. As tariffs between 
the United States and Canada fall to zero, goods from the 
two countries may be more attractive vis-a-vis goods from third 
countries, thereby threatening the level of third-country exports 
to the United States and Canada.88 The U.S.-Canada FTA also 
conflicts with one of the GAIT pillars of international trade, 
the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle enshrined in GATT 
Article 1.89 In recognition of the political and economic in-
evitability of such preferential trading arrangements, GATT 
Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b), authorizes the creation of FTAs, 
87. See Morici, Impact on the United States, Bun.DING A CANADIAN-AMERICAN 
FREE TRADE AREA 70 (Fried, Stone & Trezise eds. 1987); U.S.-Canada FTA 
Investment, Financial Portion Could Serve as GATT Model, U.S. Official Says, 
4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1264 (1987); U.S.-Canada Free Trade Accord Could 
Serve as Uruguay Round Model, GA TT Official Says, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
1268 (1987). See generally G. Hutbauer & J. Schott, Trading for Growth: The 
Next Round of Trade Negotiations (policy Analyses in Int'l Economics No. II, 
1985); Trade Policies for a Better Future, Proposals for Action (GATT Working 
Paper 1985). 
88. See Biggs, An International Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADA 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 134-40 (Stem, Trezise & Whalley eds. 1987); see also K. 
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 283-88 (1970) 
[hereinafter DAM]. 
89. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, 61 Stat. 
pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948) [hereinafter GATT]. Although 
multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade may be disrupted by a bilateral, preferential 
trading arrangement such as the FTA, it is not necessarily without some benefits, 
such as bringing negotiators closer together on issues before them at the Uruguay 
Round. 
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exempting them from the Article I MFN obligation, provided 
they meet three tests: first, Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b), 
requires elimination of tariffs and restrictions "on substantially 
all the trade [in goods] between the constituent territories in 
products originating in such territories;"90 second, Article XXIV, 
paragraph 5(c), provides that this tariff elimination must take 
place "within a reasonable length of time;' '91 third, Article 
XXIV, paragraph 5(b), in essence a standstill provision, requires 
that "the duties and other regulations [agreed to in the FT A] 
... shall not be higher or more restrictive" than those duties 
and regulations in existence prior to formation of the FT A. 92 
The U.S.-Canada FTA passes all three tests with high marks. 
All trade in goods (the only kind of trade currently the subject 
of GATT regulation) between the two countries will be duty-
free in ten years. The ten-year phase-in period compares fa-
vorably with other GATT -approved FT As, and is therefore 
probably reasonable in the context of GATT Article XXIV, 
paragraph 5(C).93 In addition, the U.S.-Canada FTA creates 
no express barriers to trade not already in existence prior· to 
conclusion of the FT A. In short, the U.S.-Canada FT A is in 
prima Jacie compliance with GATT Article XXIV. 94 
WHAT THE PARTIES 'FAILED TO AGREE To 
(HEREIN OF SUBSIDIES) 
A major irritant in trade relations between the United States 
and, Canada has been the initiation by U.S. industries of 
antidumping and countervailing duty actions against the imports 
90. Id. art. XXIV. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. In addition to these three substantive steps, under Article XXIV, 
paragraph 7(a)-(b), the other GAIT contracting parties are to be notified of the 
proposed FT A. Once negotiated, the FT A is to be submitted for GAIT review. 
See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT 581-619 (1969) [hereinafter 
JACKSON]; DAM, supra note 88, at 274-95. -
93. See H. Koh, A Legal Perspective, PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT 107-10 (Stern, Trezise & Whalley eds. 1987); JACKSON, supra 
note 92, at 603~IO. 
94. See Note, The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area: Is It GA TT Legal? 19 GEO. 
WASH. U.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 199 (1985); Note, International Trade-Agreement 
Jor the Establishment oj a Free Trade Area between the Government oj the United 
States of America and the Government oj Israel, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 289 (1986). 
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of their Canadian trading competitors.95 For many Canadians 
the application of these trade remedy procedures by the United 
States has been little more than a thinly veiled form of pro-
tectionism that has threatened predictable and assured access 
to the American market.96 I leave it to you to draw your own 
conclusion whether or not Canada has overreacted, but consider 
the following statistics: Five of the forty antidumping pro-
ceedings filed in 1988 were brought against Canadian imports.97 
There were sixteen outstanding antidumping orders and findings 
in effect against various Canadian imports as of December 31, 
1989, covering a range of products from raspberries and fresh 
cut flowers to paving equipment and steel jacks.98 Of the 
thirteen countervailing duty proceedings filed in 1988, two were 
against Canada.99 As of December 31, 1989, there were four 
outstanding countervailing duty orders and findings in effect 
95. By one count, during the five-year period from 1980 to 1985, ten antid-
umping duty (AD) investigations and 13 countervailing duty (CVD) investigations 
were conducted by the United States involving imports from Canada. During that 
same period, Canada completed 31 AD investigations involving imports from the 
United States. Battram & Glossop, Dispute Resolution Under the Canada/United 
States Free Trade Agreement, UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: 
THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 299, 309 (1988). For recent antidumping 
and countervailing duty cases involving U.S.-Canadian trade, see Canadian Meat 
Council v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 622 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987)(live swine); 
Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 445 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1987) (hogs from Canada); BMT Commodity Corp. v. United States, 
667 F. Supp. 880 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (codfish from Canada); Fresh Cut Flowers 
From Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,134 (1987); Oil Country Tubular Goods, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 15,037 (1986); Certain Red Raspberries Fro~ Can~da, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,638, 
47,124 (1985); ITC Begins [Dumping] Investigation of Fabricated Structural Steel 
Imported From Canada, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 143 (1988); Margins as High 
as 85 Percent Found in Preliminary [Commerce Department Dumping] Ruling on . 
Canadian Potash, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1067 (1987) ("In Ottawa, the gov-
ernment's reaction was immediate and sharp"); Canadian [Import] Tribunal Rec-
ommends That Cabinet Trim Countervailing Duty on U.S. Corn Imports, 4 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1316 (1987); 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 946 (1987) (Canandian 
Import Tribunal imposes duties on dumped imports of chain saws from U.S., 
Sweden, and West Germany); 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1098 (1987) (Revenue 
Canada finds dumping of U.S. imports of fertilizer handling, blending, conveying 
equipment). 
96. WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 7. 
97. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, supra note 4, at 191-92. 
98. Id. at 193. 
99. Id. at 196. 
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against Canadian imports of carnations, groundfish, oil country 
tubular goods, and live swine. loo 
Whether or not this Canadian perception is warranted, it 
was nevertheless bolstered by the notorious 1986 softwood 
lumber case in which the International Trage Administration 
of the Department of Commerce (ITA) determined that Can-
ada's method for valuating standing timber on government-
owned land constituted a countervailable subsidy,101 a deter-
mination completely at odds with the position the ITA had 
adopted just three years earlier involving the same Canadian 
program. 102 From an American viewpoint, recent antidumping 
and countervailing duty determinations by Revenue Canada, 
in particular the determination on subsidized corn from the 
United States,I03 are a transparent attempt to retaliate in kind. 104 
To some observers these trade remedy actions signaled the 
drawing of battle lines with a full-blown trade war looming 
between the world's two largest trading partners. Still, con-
sidering the relatively few antidumping (AD) or countervailing 
(CVD) actions taken by either country against the imports of 
the other prior to 1985, lOS these trade cases arguably were 
nothing more than high profile posturing by discrete sectors 
of the American business community anxious to draw attention 
to perceived unfair Canadian trade practices, all in anticipation 
of the forthcoming free trade negotiations. I06 One thing is 
100. [d. at 198. 
101. Certain Softwood Products from Canada; Preliminary Affirmative Coun· 
tervailing Duty Determination, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986). For a legal and economic 
analysis of the Softwood Products cases, see WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 89-
102. 
102. Certain Softwood Products from Canada; Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,167 (1983). 
103. Revenue Canada, Final Determination on Subsidized Corn from the United 
States of America (1987). 
104. For an overview of the U.S. and Canadian antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws, respectively, see E. ROSSIDES, U.S. IMPORT TRADE REGULATION 195-283 
(1986), and R. PATERSON, CANADIAN REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT 105-46 (1986). 
105. See WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 66-67. 
106. For example, the U.S. softwood lumber industry filed their countervailing 
duty petition with the Commerce Department just two days before formal FT A 
talks were to begin. See Koh, A Legal Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-
CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 98 (Stern, Trezise & Whalley eds. 1987). 
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certain: These cases hardened Canada's resolve that any free 
trade agreement with the United States must include a binding 
binational dispute mechanism for settling antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases with the United States. 
To understand why the AD and CVD remedies have assumed 
such significance, the U.S. tariff wall was significantly lowered 
following the Kennedy and Tokyo round of multilateral trade 
negotiations conducted under the aegis of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.107 In the Canadian view, as this 
tariff wall was being lowered, the U.S. AD and CVD laws 
were in effect substituted for the tariff as a type of contingent 
protection 108 for domestic industries being injured by foreign 
import competition. This perceived development was of special 
concern to Canada and a source of alarm. Because of Canada's 
economic vulnerability due to its deep dependence on the V.S. 
market, with merchandise exports accounting for twenty-five 
percent of Canada's GNP and with nearly eighty percent of 
all such exports destined for the Vnited States,I09 its future 
economic survival and prosperity is pegged to secure access to 
the American market. For Canadians, the mere threat of an 
AD or CVD action jeopardizes the predictability and security 
of that market and thus deters trade,l1O which in turn could 
have a profoundly adverse impact on the Canadian national 
economy. 
Against this backdrop, the initial Canadian negotiation ob-
jective during the free trade talks was, not surprisingly, to 
obtain an exemption from these two V.S. trade remedy laws, 
with a reciprocal concesssion from Canada. III The chances of 
successfully negotiating such an exemption and thereafter win-
ning congressional approval were from the outset slim to none. 
An identical proposal was floated during the negotiation of 
the V.S.-Israeli free trade agreement but was rejected by the 
107. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-
6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 V.N.T.S. 194 (1948). 
108. WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 62-70. 
109. WONNACOTI, supra note 12, at 2. 
110. As one example, noted by WONNACOTI, "the CVD investigation into 
Canadian lumber imports, undertaken in 1986, was interpreted as harassment because 
a similar investigation several years ago had ended with the determination that 
there were no countervailable subsidies." WONNACOTI, supra note 12, at 67. 
111. See Free Trade Agreement Meets All oj Canada's Demands, Mulroney 
Tells House oj Commons, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1211-12 (1987). 
HeinOnline -- 1989 Det. C.L. Rev. 826 1989
826 Detroit College of Law Review [3:805 
United States, even though much smaller volumes of trade 
were at stake in that agreement. If such an exemption was 
non-negotiable between two countries with such strong political 
and military ties as the United States and Israel, a fortiori the 
chances of securing the same kind of exemption for Canada, 
where the economic stakes were considerably higher, were equally 
doomed. Thus thrust into a world of second-best, the Canadian 
negotiators adjusted their position and made the creation of 
a binding, binational dispute review panel procedure through 
which all AD and CVD administrative determinations would 
be funneled a sine qua non to concluding a U.S.-Canada free 
trade agreement. 112 After reaching an impasse in the negotiations 
over this very issue on September 23, 1987, an eleventh-hour 
agreement was concluded on October 3, 1987, that provided, 
inter alia, for binding, binational panel review of AD and 
CVD cases involving imports from Canada and the United 
States.1I3 A free trade agreement that included this binational 
panel review provision was signed by President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Mulroney on January 2, 1988Y4 
The binational panel review articles of the FT A have been 
the subject of sharp criticism on both sides of the border, 
some Canadians charging that they do not go far enough, lIS 
some Americans maintaining that they go so far as to be 
unconstitutional. 116 
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW OF STATUTORY AMENDMENTS TO 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE AD AND 
CVD LAWS 
Chapter 19 of the FT A, the most controversial chapter in 
the entire Agreement, creates not one but two panel procedures. 
112. Canadian Negotiator Walks Out on Free Trade Talks, Leaving Future of 
Accord in Jeopardy, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1178 (1987). 
113. U.S., Canadian Officials Attain Trade Pact in Down-to-the- Wire Nego-
tiating Session, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1210 (1987). 
114. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). 
115. See 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1212 (1987). 
116. Customs and International Trade Bar Association's Statement in Opposition 
to Withdrawal of Jurisdiction in the United States Court of International Trade 
and Its Appellate Tribunals to Review Antidumping and Countervailing Duty De-
cisions of Federal Agencies Involving Canadian Merchandise, U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement, A Legal Guide 2 (BNA) C-l (1988); Customs Trade Bar Criticizes 
FTA Binational Dispute Panel, Citing Constitutional Issues, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1589 (1987). See Christenson & Gambrel, Constitutionality of Binational 
Panel Review in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAW. 401 (1989). 
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One is designed to review final AD and CVD administrative 
determinations, thus substituting judicial review of such de-
terminations with binational panel review. 117 The second has 
been established to screen amendments to each country's AD 
and CVD laws. These two procedures are intended to be stop-
gap measures, however, and not a permanent feature of the 
FTA landscape. Under Article 1906, the parties have five years 
. to develop a substitute system for the current AD and CVD 
legal regime. If no such substitute system is agreed to or 
implemented within that five-year period, the parties have an 
additional two years within which to reach such agreement. 
Failing such agreement, either party may terminate the FT A 
on six months' notice. Article 1906 only hints at the kind of 
substitute AD and CVD legal regime the parties are supposed 
to adopt. Will the substitute system exempt each country from 
the other's AD and CVD laws? Will the definition of a coun-
tervailable subsidy be broadened in order to exempt more or 
most Canadian assistance programs? Will a larger de minimis 
subsidy and dumping margin (currently .5 percent in the United 
States) be adopted so that only the most serious cases will 
receive administrative relief? The answer the FT A gives to these 
questions is cryptic.11s Article 1907 directs the parties to establish 
a Working Group that will: 
a) seek to develop more effective rules and disciplines concerning 
the use of government subsidies; 
b) seek to develop a substitute system of rules for dealing with 
unfair pricing and government subsidization; and 
c) consider any problems that may arise with respect to the im-
plementation of this Chapter and recommend solutions, where ap-
propriate,l19 
Whether this mandate contemplates wholesale scrapping of 
the current AD and CVD statutory scheme as applied to the 
117. FrA, art. 1904.1. 
118. See Horlick & Landers, The Free Trade Agreement Working Group: De-
veloping a Harmonized and Improved Countervailing Duty Law, UNITED STATES/ 
CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 399 
(1988) A.B.A. SEC. INT. L. & PRAC.; Powell, Antidumping Law and the United 
States/Canada Free Trade Agreement: Possible Next Steps, UNITED STATES/CANADA 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 415. 
119. FrA, art. 1907.1. 
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imports of each party, or whether something less ambitious is 
envisioned, it is difficult to say. It is fairly safe to predict, 
however, that the most contentious subject on the Working 
Group's agenda will be subsidization, given the very sensitive 
nature of this subject for Canada. At present, both the United 
States and Canada are in the data collection stage, so that it 
may be some time before formal talks begin. 120 
Before explaining the changes that Chapter 19 makes to 
existing AD and CVD pra~tice, let me first describe five current 
practices that Chapter 19 has not changed. First, Canada and 
the United States retain the right to apply their AD and CVD 
laws to each other's imports. 121 Recalling that Canada's de-
sideratum when it entered into the FT A negotiations was to 
obtain an exemption from U.S. AD and CVD laws, Article 
1902 represents a significant Canadian concession. 
Second, future amendments to the AD or CVD laws by 
Congress or Parliament will apply to Canadian and American 
imports, respectively, provided that the amendment expressly 
so states. 122 Article 1902 contains a weak standstill provision 
on AD and CVD amendments, permitting their application to 
the other party only to the extent they are consistent with 
GAIT, the GATT Antidumping Code,123 the GAIT Subsidies 
Code,124 and the object and purpose of the FTA. I say "weak" 
because of the notoriously vacillating nature of the GATT 
Subsidies Code over the legality of domestic subsidies. For 
example, Article 11, paragraph 1, of the GATT Subsidies Code 
provides in part: 
120. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 985 (1989). 
121. FTA, art. 1902.1. 
122. FTA, art. 1902.2(a). Before amendments are made to the AD or CVD 
laws, the parties are required to notify and consult with each other on the proposed 
amendment prior to its enactment. FTA, art. 1902.2(b)-(c). 
123. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 171-88 (1980). 
See FTA, art. 1902.2(d)(i). 
124. Agreement on Implementation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GAIT, Basic Instruments 
and Selected Documents 56-83 (1980). See FTA, art. 1902.2(d)(i). See generally G. 
Hufbauer & J. Erb, SUBsmms IN INTERNATIONAL 'TRADE (1984); Barcello, Subsidies, 
Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L 
L.J. 257 (1980). 
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Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export subsidies [i.e., 
domestic subsidies] are widely used as important instruments for 
the promotion of social and economic policy objectives and do not 
intend to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to 
achieve these and other important policy objectives which they 
consider desirable. 12s 
829 
Article 11 goes on to provide in paragraph 2 that "Signatories 
recognize, however, that [domestic] subsides ... may cause 
or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry of another 
signatory . . . . Signatories shall therefore seek to avoid causing 
such effects through the use of subsidies. "126 
This vacillation is largely reflected in Article 1902, paragraph 
2(d)(ii), of the Agreement. That Article states that the object 
and purpose of the FTA "[I]s to establish fair and predictable 
conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade between 
the two countries while maintaining effective disciplines on 
unfair trade practices, such object and purpose to be ascertained 
from the provisions of this Agreement, its preamble and ob-
jectives, and the practices of the Parties. "127 The Preamble to 
the FT A in turn includes two objectives which arguably would 
authorize use of domestic subsidies, the first being "[t]o pro-
mote productivity, full employment, and a steady improvement 
of living standards in their respective countries,"128 the second 
being "[t]o reduce government-created trade distortions while 
preserving the Parties' flexibility to safeguard the public wel-
fare. "129 This absence of a bright line definition of prohibited 
subsidies is a matter that will undoubtedly be addressed by 
the Article 1906 Working Group. 
A third item left unchanged by the FT A is· the applicable 
law in a binational panel review of a final AD or CVD 
administrative determination. The domestic law of the country 
whose determination is under challenge will be the source of 
applicable law, including legislative history, regulations, ad-
ministrative practice, and case law to the extent a court of 
125. GAIT Subsidies Code, art. 11, para. 1. 
126. GAIT Subsidies Code, art. 11, para. 2. 
127. Fr A, art 1902, para. 2. 
128. FrA, Preamble. 
129. Id. 
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the importing country would rely on such materials in reviewing 
an AD or CVD determination. 130 
Fourth, Chapter 19 makes no changes with respect to judicial 
review of administrative determinations which are not final, 131 
thereby preserving the power of the U.S. Court of International 
Trade to: (1) issue an injunction enjoining liquidation of entries· 
subject to a final AD or CVD determination pending binational 
panel review, (2) order disclosure of business confidential in-
formation submitted to the ITA or the ITC during the course 
of an AD or CVD investigation, and (3) review an ITA decision 
not to conduct an AD or CVD investigation. 
Fifth, Chapter 19 is prospective only, applying to final de-
terminations rendered, and to statutory amendments made, 
after entry into force of the FT A. 132 With what remains un-
changed under Chapter 19 as backdrop, how does Chapter 19 
affect the power of the parties to enforce and amend their 
AD and CVD statutes? 
ARTICLE 1903 PANEL REVIEW OF AD AND CVD STATUTORY 
AMENDMENTS 
Although the commitments made by the parties under the 
Article 1902 standstill provision on AD and CVD statutory 
amendments are comparatively soft, those commitments nev-
ertheless are not without bite owing to the creation of a panel 
procedure for reviewing all such statutory amendments. J33 After 
its enactment, any AD or CVD amendment may be referred 
to a panel for a declaration (1) whether the amendment is 
consistent with the FT A, the Antidumping Code, the Subsidies 
Code, or GATT generally; 134 or (2) whether the amendment 
reverses a binational panel decision and, if so, whether that 
amendment conforms with GATT, the two GATT Codes, and 
the FT A.135 The FT A makes no provision for resort by private 
parties to an Article 1903 panel proceeding. Thus, only Canada 
130. FrA, art. 1904.2. 
131. FrA, art. 1904.10. 
132. FrA, art. 1905. 
133. FrA, art. 1904; annex 1903.2. 
134. FrA, art. 1903. 1 (a). 
135. FrA, art. 1902.1(b). 
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and the United States, through their national representatives, 
may demand and appear in this specific binational panel pro-
ceeding. 136 
The composition of all Chapter 19 panels is the same re-
gardless of whether the challenge is to an AD or CVD statutory 
amendment or to an AD or CVD determination. First, Annex 
1901.2, paragraph 1, states that "the Parties shall develop a 
roster of individuals to serve as panelists in disputes under 
this Chapter." 137 Annex 1901.2 further provides for five-mem-
ber panels with each party appointing two panelists and a fifth 
neutral panelist being mutually selected. by the parties or by 
the four appointed panelists under Annex 1901.2, paragraphs 
1-3. A majority of any Chapter 19 panel must be lawyers. 138 
Second, panel decisions are to be based solely on the parties' 
oral and written submissions.139 Third, Article 1903 panel pro-
ceedings leading to the panel's final declaratory opinion are 
confidential, unless the parties otherwise agree, and its final 
opinion may not be published if the parties so agree. l40 Fourth, 
Article 1903 panels proceed under rigorous time constraints. 
Within ninety days after appointment of the panel chair (which 
is to be done promptly after appointment of the fifth pan-
elist) , 141 an initial opinion containing findings of fact and a 
determination is issued. 142 In the event of an affirmative de-
termination (one that finds the statutory amendment in violation 
of Article 1902), the panel may make recommendations on 
how the amendment can be brought into conformity with 
Article 1902. 143 The parties may request reconsideration of the 
panel's initial opinion within fourteen days after its issuance. 
A final opinion is to be issued within thirty days after the 
request for reconsideration. l44 If the panel recommends mod-
136. See FTA, art. 1903; annex 1903.2. 
137. FTA, annex 1901.2, para 2. 
138. FTA, annex 1901.2, para. 2; U.S. implementing legislation may contain 
a proposal that judges oj the Court oj International Trade be eligible to serve as 
binational panelists. 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 279 (1988). 
139. FTA, annex 1903.2, para. 1. 
140. 'FTA, annex 1903.2, para. 1, 5. 
141. FTA, annex 1901.2, para. 4; annex 1903.2, para. 2. 
142. FTA, annex 1903.2, para. 2. 
143. FTA, annex 1903.2, para. 3. 
144. FTA, annex 1903.2, para. 4. 
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ifications to the offending statutory amendment, the parties 
are to consult with one another in an effort to remedy the 
nonconformity.145 As part of their consultations, the parties 
may draft remedial legislation that must be enacted within nine 
months after the consultations are concluded, absent some other 
agreement. Unless the remedial legislation is enacted, the ag-
grieved party may either retaliate thr~ugh comparable legislative 
or executive action, or terminate the Agreement. 146 
In sum, although the commitment to refrain from enacting 
protectionist AD or CVD statutory amendments may lack a 
hard edge, the remedial provisions that can be invoked fol-
lowing the enactment of such amendments do have potential 
sting. Whether the threat to terminate the Agreement or to 
retaliate in kind with reciprocal legislative or executive action 
is credible, or even effective if carried out, remains to be seen. 
One thing is certain, however: Chapter 19 has set the stage 
for high-stakes brinksmanship. 
BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEW OF FINAL AD AND CVD 
DETERMINATIONS 
The second dispute settlement forum created under Chapter 
19 is the binational panel for reviewing final AD and CVD 
administrative determinations. Its function is simply stated: 
Binational panel review replaces judicial review of final AD 
and CVD determinations. 147 Its composition and procedures 
are identical to those of Article 1903 panels. 148 The applicable 
substantive law, the standard of review, and general legal 
principles are those of the importing party.149 This body of 
law includes the AD and CVD statutes, their legislative history, 
administrative regulations, administrative practice, rules of stat-
utory construction, and case law to the extent such sources 
of law would be considered by a reviewing court of the im-
porting party. 150 The parties are to adopt rules of procedure 
145. FfA, art. 1903.3(a). 
146. FfA, art. 1903.3(b)(i)-(ii). 
147. FfA, art. 1904.1. 
148. See supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text. 
149. [d.; FfA, art. 1911. 
150. FfA, art. 1904.2-3. 
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for the panel based upon judicial rules of appellate procedure, 
further judicializing the process. 151 Private parties have the same 
standing and right to panel review as they do to judicial review 
under domestic law. ls2 Panel proceedings are to be conducted 
under an expedited time schedule so that panel decisions issue 
within 315 days from the date of the initial request for panel 
review. 153 Decisions of the panel are binding and ordinarily 
final,ls4 subject to extraordinary challenge only (1) where a 
panelist is guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict 
of interest, where a panel has seriously departed from a fun-
damental procedural rule, or where the panel has exceeded its 
Article 1904 powers; and (2) any of those occurrences materially 
affected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the 
binational panel review process. ISS The first binational dispute 
panels under Chapter 19 were named in June of 1989 at the 
request of Canada to challenge two orders of the Department 
of Commerce involving raspberries and paving equipment. 156 
ALTERNATIVE COUNTERVAILING DUTY LEGAL REGIMES 
Now that they have committed themselves to use their best 
efforts to draft a substitute CVD legal regime over the next 
seven years, where do Canada and the United States go from 
here? The problem of subsidies should not be exaggerated, 
given its relatively modest impact on trade between Canada 
and the United States. A recent Canadian study on subsidies 
completed this year finds that the estimated average rate of 
federal subsidies to eighty-three non-agricultural industries was 
0.50070 in the United States in 1984, and 1.010J0 in Canada 
for the same year.1S7 That study found that subsidy margins 
151. ITA, art. 1904.14. 
152. ITA, art. 1904.5, 1904.7. 
153. ITA, art. 1904.14. 
154. ITA, art. 1904.9, 1904.11. 
155. ITA, art. 1904.13. The extraordinary challenge panel consists of three 
members selected from a roster of judges and former judges from the U.S. federal 
bench and from Canadian courts of superior jurisdiction. ITA, annex 1904.13, 
para. 1. 
156. 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 806 (1989). 
157. 1.F. BENCE & M. SMITH, SUBsIDms AND THE TRADE LAWS: THE CANADA-
U.S. DIMENSION 18, 22 (1989). 
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are low in both countries, with only five of eighty-three in-
dustries in Canada and four of eighty-three in the United 
States, receiving subsidies greater than five percent. Neverthe-
less, while the imposition of countervailing duties in fact affects 
only a modest amount of bilateral trade between Canada and 
the United States, the risk of harassment is a continuous threat, 
especially for Canadians who require predictable and assured 
access to the American market. Moreover, because of the 
perception in Canada that the use of subsidies is a national 
prerogative and that any suggestion to limit that use is a· threat 
to national sovereignty, the CVD issue figured prominently in 
discussions over free trade between Canada and the United 
States. Unfortunately, because it is so politically sensitive, the 
issue of countervailing duties in U.S.-Canadian trade has been 
blown out of proportion to its actual economic significance. 
This is truly an economic tempest in a teapot in view of the 
historically small CVD margins that the IT A has found for 
Canadian imports (under six percent,IS8 the fifteen percent 
margin in Softwood LumberlS9 being an exceptional case). An 
equally important, but overlooked fact, is that the return to 
even a successful petitioner has been negligible given the small 
CVD margins typically found in these cases, coupled with the 
cost in attorneys' fees and the demands on executive time. l60 
158. See, e.g., Oil Country Tubular Goods, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,037 (1986) (less 
than one percent); Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,124 
(1985) (less than one percent); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish, 51 . Fed. Reg. 
10,041 (1986) (5.82 percent); Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,134 
(1987) (1.47 percent). 
159. Bello & Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series ll, The U.S.-Canada 
Lumber Agreement: Past as Prologue, 21 INT'L LAW. 1185, 1194 (1987). 
160. See Horlick & Landers, The Free Trade Agreement Working Group: De-
veloping a Harmonized and Improved Countervailing Duty Law, in THE U.S.-
CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 1988 
A.B.A. SEC. INT. L. & PRAC. 404-05 & n. 5 (1988) [hereinafter Horlick & Landers]. 
On the costs to Canadian industries of defending against CVD cases, see Rugman, 
U.S. Protectionism and Canadian Trade Policy, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 363, 373 
(1986), where the author states: 
In the first nine months of the Atlantic fresh groundfish countervail the 
costs approached one million dollars raised by the Fisheries Council of 
Canada from independent fisherman as well as the only large integrated 
Nova Scotia fish producer, National Sea Products Ltd. The costs to the 
Canadian steel industry in 1983-84 ITC cases were well over one million 
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Canada and the United States are not that far apart in their 
approach to subsidies and in their administration of their 
respective CVD statutes. In fact, the administrative procedure 
adopted by each country is remarkably parallel, probably owing 
in large measure to the GAIT Subsidies Code which set out 
the basic procedural framework to be followed when a country 
imposes a countervailing duty. One significant area where Can-
ada and the United States do part paths, however, is in their 
treatment of regional programs. In the Grain Corn161 deter-
mination, the Department of National Revenue made it clear 
that with certain qualifications regional programs of another 
country do not constitute countervailable subsidies. The Com-
merce Department's "Preferentiality Appendix," 162 published 
in 1986, shows that the U.S. position on this score is dia-
metrically opposed to the Canadian view: Because regional 
programs are not generally available, but rather are preferential, 
and because they confer a benefit upon that particular geo-
graphic region, they are countervailable under the specificity 
test. 163 
Notwithstanding this philosophical difference over regional 
subsidies, substantively, both countries' CVD laws are re-
markably similar. The hallmark of countervailability in both 
countries is preferentiality, as exemplified in the specificity test 
employed on both sides of the border. These two CVD laws 
share much in common procedurally and substantively, al-
though concededly parting paths over their treatment of regional 
subsidies. 
The Chapter 19 Working Group, charged with the task of 
hammering out a substitute CVD regime that will cover all 
dollars. The costs to Canadian hog and pork producers, dried saltcod 
producers, raspberry producers, sugar producers and others are also of 
considerable magnitude. 
Rugman, supra this note, at 373. 
161. Grain Com Case (Can. v. U.S.), Canadian Import Tribunal, Inquiry No. 
CI7-7-86 (1987). 
162. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,272 (1986). 
163. For additional reading on the specificity test, see Panzarella, Is the Spec-
ificity Test Generally Available? 18 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 417 (1986) [hereinafter 
Panzarella]; Note, Countervailing Duties and the Specificity Test: An Alternative 
Approach to the Definition oj "Bounty or Grant," .18 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 475 
(1986). 
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Canadian-U.S. trade inter sese, has a broad range of substitute 
CVD regimes from which to choose. l64 Some have suggested 
that an agreement could be concluded that would mitigate the 
impact of each countries' CVD law by, for example, (1) raising 
the de minimis level from .5070, or (2) requiring a fixed per-
centage of (a) market penetration by imports and/or (b) price 
undercutting by imports. 16s A substitute system could require 
a more demanding injury standard, particularly at the prelim-
inary stage where the "reasonable indication"l66 evidentiary 
threshold for petitioners is extremely low. Tinkering with the 
CVD laws at the edges, however, will no't necessarily eliminate 
the filing of unfounded petitions and the accompanying ha-
rassment factor (although careful agency screening prior to 
initiation of an investigation could mitigate the harassment 
factor). 
A total exemption from each other's CVD law is another 
option,167 although in the opinion of some commentators a 
blanket exemption is a political impossibility. 168 A bilateral 
164. See, e.g., Horlick & Landers, supra note 160. 
165. For these and other suggestions, see Horlick & Landers, supra note 160, 
at 412-15; Smith, A Canadian Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON A U.S.-CANADIAN 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31, 43 (Stern, Trezise & Whalley eds. 1987) [hereinafter 
Smith]; WONNACOTT, supra note 12, at 101-08. 
166. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1986). 
167. See Terry, Sovereignty, Subsidies, and Countervailing Duties in the Context 
of the Canada-U.S. Trading Relationship, 46 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 48 (1988), 
where the author notes: 
One approach is that taken in the agreements between the European 
Community and the European Free Trade Association countries. Under 
these agreements, each party pledges to dismantle voluntarily any subsidy 
programs that distort trade. If one party does not live up to its commitment, 
the other retains the right to invoke countervailing duties. 
Another model is provided by the European Community itself. It does 
not permit countervailing duties on trade among member countries, and 
uses a complex supranational regulatory and legal system to control the 
subsidy practices of its members. 
Id. at 92-93 (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Terry]. See also J. BESELER & A. 
Wll.LIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANn-SUBSIDY LAW, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
(1986); Panzarella, supra note 163, at 428-41. 
168. See Horlick & Landers, supra note 160, at 403. Two examples of where 
countries entered into a free trade arrangement but did not create a CVD exemption 
are the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement and the Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement signed by New Zealand and Australia in 1983. See Lussenburg, A Legal 
Framework for Freer Canada-United States Trade: A Consideration of the Australia-
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exemption would require at a minimum a commitment from 
Canada and the United States to limit their subsidy practices.'69 
The political feasibility question aside, any substitute system 
that accords favored bilateral treatment (as any of these ex-
emptions would) derogates from GATT's unconditional most-
favored-nation cornerstone, one of the pillars of trade liber-
alization.'70 Granting bilateral exemptions runs the risk of driv-
ing a wedge between North' America and its two other major 
trading partners, Japan and the European Communities (EC). 
Any substitute system that in the long run fuels a trade war 
with the other trading partners of Canada and the United 
States is clearly undesirable. In short, while the desiderata 
should be amendments to the CVD statutes that are applicable 
to all imports regardless of origin, making such amendments 
generally applicable reduces the chances of seeing them enacted 
by the national legislatures. 
Because of the international trade friction that would likely 
result from a bilateral CVD exemption (assuming such an 
exemption could be successfully passed through Parliament and 
Congress), an exemption would probably not be in the long-
term best interests of either Canada or the United States. A 
proposal that might fare better in the political arena would 
be to create a binational administrative agency which would 
administer a CVD code applicable on a conditional MFN 
basisY' On the administrative level, the first step would be 
to merge the two countries' processes by creating a binational 
administrative agency. Given the similarity in administrative 
New Zealand Agreement Jor Closer Economic Relations, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE 91 (Irish & Carasco, eds. 1987)[hereafter LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA-U.S. TRADE]; James, The Agreement on Establishment 
oj a Free Trade Area Between the Government oj the United States oj America 
and the Government oj Israel: Background and Analysis, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CANADA-U.S. TRADE, supra this note, at 121. 
169. See Smith, supra note 165, at 44. 
170. See McRae & Thomas, The Development oj the Most-Favored-Nation 
Principle: Treaties oj Friendship, Navigation and Commerce and the GA TT, LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA-U.S. TRADE, supra note 168, at 225. 
171. A variation on this theme has been a proposal to limit a binational 
administrative agency's responsibility to a determination of whether an unlawful 
subsidy exists, leaving it with national tribunals to determine whether such subsidized 
imports are the cause of material injury. See Terry, supra note 167, at 94. 
HeinOnline -- 1989 Det. C.L. Rev. 838 1989
838 Detroit College oj Law Review [3:805 
procedure followed in both countries, creating a binational 
administrative agency or agencies to administer a bilateral CVD 
code is one option that would not be extremely difficult to 
implement, at least insofar as the establishment of such an 
administrative agency is concerned, considering that this has 
already been done at the judicial review level with the Chapter 
19 binational review panels completely replacing the Canadian 
and U . S. courts in reviewing administrative determinations 
reached by Revenue Canada, the . International Trade Tribunal, 
the ITA, and the International Trade Commission. Establishing 
binational administrative bodies would be little more than a 
. cosmetic gesture, however, if the Canadian and U.S. CVD 
laws are not at the same time harmonized. Although arguably 
a binational administrative agency would be less susceptible to 
political pressure (assuming such pressure exists and is effective 
in influencing administrative decisions in the first place),172 if 
such a supranational body did administer the current CVD 
laws of the two countries it would be tantamount to pouring 
old wine into a new bottle. And, of course, Chapter 19 bi-
national review panels are exactly that-old wine in a new 
bottle-because they are required to apply the law of the 
country imposing the countervailing duty in the same manner 
as a reviewing court in that country would. 173 
Harmonizing the two countries' CVD statutes has the ad-
vantage of eliminating the CVD laws as a trade flash point. 
By expanding on a CVD code to make it not just applicable 
bilaterally, but rather multilaterally, on a conditional MFN 
basis, there is a reasonable prospect that a multilateral trade 
war could be avoided. Ideally, a code should be applicable on 
an unconditional MFN basis, in order to avoid the discrimi-
nation that creeps into a trade system based on reciprocity 
and preferences and to eliminate the barriers to the free flow 
of goods across national borders. However, the odds of getting 
172. With judicial review existing for all final administrative determinations of 
the ITA and the lTC, rational decision making consistent with a statute has to 
be the hallmark of any determination reached by these agencies or such deter-
minations will not be sustained upon judicial review. Thus, judicial review serves 
as a sword and shield for the agencies involved, arming them with defenses with 
which they can deflect extralegal arguments. 
173. ITA, art. 1904.3. 
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a CVD code enacted on an unconditional MFN basis are 
probably low. Making a bilateral CVD code applicable on a 
conditional MFN basis enhances the chances for such a code 
being enacted by Congress. Nevertheless, even if only a bilateral 
CVD code that exempts regional subsidies with qualifications 
(as will be discussed below) is agreed to between Canada and 
the United States, and that code is applicable on a conditional 
MFN basis, the EC should automatically qualify for code 
coverage, given its practice of exempting regional subsidies that 
are not trade distorting.I74 In any event, the EC's role in both 
Canadian and U.S. trade is so prominent, it is a trading partner 
deserving of sympathetic consideration in Working Group ne-
gotiations. Coverage under a CVD code should be extended. 
Although there is undeniably a good deal of fine tuning 
that would be required before a binational administrative agency 
charged with administering a binational CVD code could be 
implemented, at bottom the single greatest sticking point to 
harmonization of the Canadian and U.S. CVD laws is the 
issue of regional subsidies. For Canadians, this is an especially 
sensitive matter, as reflected in vehement denials by the Ca-
nadian government that FT A negotiators had offered to restrict 
regional subsidies as part of a free trade package. I7S The ob-
jection to subsidies is that they distort the allocation of re-
sources within a market by sending a signal to capitalists and 
entreprenuers where they should invest capital, thus diverting 
domestic resources from possibly more productive uses and at 
the same'time denying a sale to competing foreign industries. 176 
But not all government interventions are efficiency distorting; 
indeed, they may correct a market distortion or market ex-
ternality.177 As summarized by one commentator: 
Subsidies granted . . . to new investment in depressed geographical 
regions have a more particularized effect on the output of given 
174. See Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 FED. REG. 39, 304 (1982); 
See also infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
175. No Proposal on Regional Subsidies Offered by Canada in FTA Negotiations, 
Reisman Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1512 (1988). 
176. See Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International 
Trade, 70 MICH. L. REv. 831, 840 (1972). 
177. See Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and A Proposal, 
9 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 779, 788-94 (1977) [hereinafter Barcelo]. 
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products. They are likely to have more pronounced effects on trade 
flows, as well. Should such subsidies be prohibited and countries 
be free to countervail or take other retaliatory action against them? 
Arguments for such a general rule face two serious difficulties. 
First, in a given case such government interventions in the domestic 
market, in contrast generally to export subsidies, may be either 
efficiency enhancing or distorting. A general prohibition cannot be 
based on the certainty that such subsidies are always inefficient. 
Second, even if a given subsidy is clearly inefficient ... governments 
may pursue such a policy for internal political or socioeconomic 
objectives. 178 
If it can be demonstrated that regional subsidies are not 
trade distorting, they should not be countervailed. In the 1982 
steel cases involving EC steel imports to the United States, 
the BC argued that no benefit was conferred by government 
incentives to invest in disadvantaged geographic regions where 
those incentives were specifically designed to offset the dis-
location costs of establishing a business in that region. Since 
they do not confer a benefit, the argument ran, they cannot 
by definition be trade distorting. The ITA rejected this ar-
gument, stating that subsidies which affect the comparative 
advantage of a region are by definition trade-distorting. 179 This 
may be true on a strictly national level, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the same is true on a world level. The 
United States should reconsider its position on this question 
and allow for the possibility that certain regional subsidies do 
nothing more than equalize competitive conditions within a 
geographic area vis-a-vis the rest of the nation (e.g., lack of 
infrastructure or skilled workforce). As long as there is no 
trade distortion on the international level, regional subsidies 
should not be countervailed. As noted by Professor Barcelo: 
[I]t can be argued that a subsidizing country at least should have 
the right to submit evidence that the subsidy in question does not 
distort world trade. For example, a country might be able to show 
that a subsidy on new investment in a depressed and backward 
geographical region was just adequate to offset the added costs of 
locating in the region and that the subsidy was nondistortive. A 
successful submission should mean that the subsidy in question 
178. Barcelo, supra note 177, at 837 (footnotes omitted). 
179. Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304 (1982). 
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would be permitted and offsetting countervailing duties would not 
be allowed. ISO 
841 
A variation on this theme that has been proposed elsewhere181 
is to permit the imposition of countervailing duties on the net 
subsidy in regional development cases. The net subsidy would 
be derived by deducting from the government assistance the 
increased costs of locating in a depressed region as measured 
against locating in the prime industrial area within the country. 
Regional subsidies would thus only be countervailable to the 
extent they gave an industry a net competitive advantage vis-
a-vis other firms within the national market. This in fact was 
the U.S. practice prior to 1979, a practice rejected by Congress 
when it enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 182 By 
coupling this net subsidy concept with a higher de minimis 
threshold (to say, four or five percent) many regional devel-
opment programs would escape the CVD net. 
In conclusion, nominal regional subsidies that are in fact 
disguised export subsidies should not be permitted. This could 
occur where the level of assistance was so high, and the resulting 
stimulative effect on production so great, that the domestic 
economy was totally incapable of absorbing the major portion 
of output of industries located in the region. Second, the regions 
eligible for government assistance should be agreed to and 
identified in advance. Third, the kind and level of government 
assistance should be agreed to in advance if possible, in order 
to avoid the disguised export subsidy problem. Alternatively, 
the amount of import penetration of goods manufactured in 
the region receiving the subsidy could be agreed to in advance, 
thereby serving in effect as a predetermination of injury to 
the competing domestic industry. The regional subsidies issue 
presents thorny negotiating" problems, but none of them are 
intractable. 
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